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Former presidential candidate
Ross Perot would have described it
as alatge suckrng sound, the col-
lective gasp that insurance consu-
mer counsel all around the United
States made when they watched
George Bush announce on TV that
the Wodd Trade Center âttacks
were "an zct of war." Â presidential
declaration of war could have the
legal import of subjecting tens of
thousands of personal and
commercial insurance claims that
would arise from the September
catastrophe to the "act-of-war
exclusions" that typically dot most
insurance policies.
The magnitude of the loss of
lives a¡rd property was surreal: The
destruction of four jetliners and the
kilhng of all their crews and passen-
gers, the collapse of one of the
largest pieces of commercial teal
estate in the wodd and damage to
the surrounding buildings, partial
destruction of the Pentagon, the
death of thousands of workers in
and around the buildings, the loss
of lives of hundreds of emergency
response personnel, destruction of
thousa¡rds of vehicles, and loss of
t-hat great mass of office systems,
equipment, fumiture, files, and
personal belongings that filled the
hundreds of business offices that
disappeared nto rubble and, finally,
the endless ripples of business
interruption for those companies.
This is a nation whose people,
businesses, and industries insure
against catastrophe, and it was
immediztely clear that the ability to
cope with the flrnancial loss was
gourg to involve massive insurance
cláims. In an eerie prediction of the
future, an insurance industry analyst
in 1999 had made a rough calcula-
tion of the life insurance loss if
5,500people died from anactof
terrorism in the downtown core of a
U.S. city. Assuming a conservative
$100,000 
^vetage 
life insurance per
worker, the cost of life insurance
benefìts alone in such a catastrophe
would be $550,000,000.1 Rematk-
ably, almost 5,000 people subse-
quently died in the September LL
attacks.
Most of those killed were
adults acting in the course and scope
of employment, which could result
in thousands of compensable
workers' compensation claims for
surviving dependents. An unknown
number of injured will file work
comp claims for medical and
disability benefits. Though there
has been no indication that workers'
compensation carriers ìntend to
deny claims from September 1,1",
legal issues may surface about
whether njuries or death as a result
of terrorism meet the requirement
that they "arise out of' the employ-
ment. Not all injuries that occut at
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the wotkplace are cornpensable.
Traditionally, the employee had to
show that the injury was caused by
an increased risk imposed by the
employment distinct from the risk
to the general public.2 Now, many
jurisdictions have adopted the
"positional risk doctrine" undet
which the causal link is made if the
"conditions and obligations of em-
ployment" place the employee in a
positron where he was injured.3
The World Trade Center had
just been leased to a real estate
investment trust under a $3.2
billion, 99 -yezr lease agreement. The
German reinsurance firm, Ffanover
Re, said the WTC was insured for
$4 billion in property damage and
$400 million for business inter-
ruption. Business loss for the
companies in the towers and arca
affected by the bombing is incal-
culable. Âfter the 1993 WTC
bombing, New York City offrcials
estjmated company and govemment
losses at $ó92 million per week if
the Wodd Trade Center were closed.4
Initrally, several insurance
companies cited President Bush's
declaration that the f etliner attacks
constituted "aflàct ofwar" and
ndicated an intention to invoke the
act-of-wæ exclusions common in
the policies. Cox Insurance in
Btitain, which insured part of the
Wodd Trade Center, said it might
try to reject claims on policies where
the acts of warwere specifically
excluded citing the "major impact"
the attacks would have on its prof-
its. XL Capital Limited, another in-
surer with substantial risk, estimated
its potential liabilities from the at-
rack at $700 million but held off on
asserting its act of war exclusions.
,A.rab Insurance Group, the Arab
wodd's largest insurer based in
Bahnin, noted tersely that the act-
of-war exclusions issue "adds
another legal dimension to the in-
surarìce aspect of this catastrophe."
However, within days, the
insurance industry was making clear
its election not to assert the war risk
exclusions. Metropolitan Life quickly
said itwould pay $300 million in
death benefìts for survivors of the
\X/TC attacks. Chubb Corporatron
issued a flews release saying that the
act-oÊwar exclusions would not
apply. Hatford Financial Services
Group, Inc. concurred a¡rd said it had
already begun pzytrrg out claìms. The
major insurance trade organizations
ptedicted theit members would not
try to use the defense. Â spokesman
for the Amedcan Council of Life
Insurers said, "It's not an issue."
The insurers recognized three
realities that prompted their readi-
ness to honor claims in spite of the
magnitude of the losses. First, with
the exception of aviation policies,
their policy exclusions were for "acts-
of-war" and not for terrorism.
Second, existing case law had
construed the war dsk clauses to
mean actions between sovereign
nations. Third, and pethaps most
importantly, the catriers recognized
rhzt any attempt to stand behind the
exclusions in the face of the intense
nattonal emotion arising out of the
attacks would be a colossal public
relations disaster. As the Director of
Insurance with the Consumer
Federation of America said, "Itwould
be very hard for a company to do that
[assert the war exclusion] even if
they're right."
Nevertheles s, one anaìyst
speaking on National Public Radio
thought it realistic that, out of the
public eye, reinsurers might assert the
act-of-war exclusions against the
prknary carriers. While the reinsurers
accept premiums to guatd front line
carriers against ltrwrcial catas trophes,
they apparently were not planning on
a,garîe where the stakes were so high.
Germany's Munich reinsurance esti-
mated its liabilitres from the bombrngs
at up to $903 million, Swiss Re at
$730 million , and Zurich Financid, at
$400 million. The CEO of Carvill
America, Inc., z reinsurance broker in
Norwald, Conn., predicted that clarms
of the policyholders would be
honored but that the industry would
then engage in wrangling over
which insurers would be liable for
those claims.
It is axiomatic that if the
insurers are forced to pay enorrnous
claims as a result of the bombings,
they themselves will become
plaintiffs in subrogation claims
against economically viable sources
who they believe should have been
able to prevent the losses. As one
writer says, insurance companies
have the resources to be powerfrrl
plaintiffs.s Insurers for the defen-
dants in the subrogation claims who
are facedwith providing defense or
indemnity of these large claims may
have more incentive and less public
relations risk in asserting war risk
exclusions of coverage.
According to the Insurance
Information Institute, the attacks
on the V7orld Trade Center in New
York on September L1, 200L, will
ultimately be the most costly man-
made or nab;lrd. catastrophe in U.S.
history. The 1993 bombing of the
Wodd Trade Center caused losses
of $510 million, the Los Angeles
riots of 1992,ff775 million, and the
Oklahoma City bombing $125
million. It is also notable that the
World Trade Center bombing in
1993 resulted 1n 17 4 lawsuits
seeking àtotal of $1.9 billion.
Natural disasters such as the
Northridge Earthquake in Southern
Californiawhich caused $16 billion
in insured losses, and Hurricane
Andrew in 1992 at $15.5 billion,
pale in comparison to the
September 11 Wodd Trade Center
attack which is expected to tally
insured losses of between $30
billion and $70 billion. Montana's
Insurance Commissioner, John
Morrison, related the estimated $30
to $70 billion WTC losses to the
wodd insuralce industry's total
supply of money of $300 billion and
concluded that the cla-ims may
amount to a fifth or sixth of that
supply, a situation that will surely
cause rates to increase.6 Insurance
ratings analysts predicted that
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liability of the property carrlers
would be modest but that risk to
the workers' compensation and
business interruption insurers was
virtually unhmrted in terms of
number of claims. Life insurance,
commercial generaì liability
insurance, commercial propertY
insurance, homeowners insurance,
auto insurance, and workers' comp-
ensatron insurance will all play
maior parts in covering the losses
of September 1-1.
Prevalence of the Exclusions
The Insurance Services
Office, Inc. rn New York, ffade
orgønizaTion for the propeny/
casualty insurance mdustry, drafts
rhe forms for the industry. The ISO
forms contain broad exclusions that
the insurer will "not pay for loss or
damage caused drtectly or indirectly
by war and military action." The
exclusions include undeclared civil
wars and "warlike acaonby a
mtlitary force," as well as insur-
rection, rebellion, or revolution.
Consequently, all standard properlry
and liability policies, including
homeowners a¡rd auto policies,
urclude war risk exclusions. How-
ever, as a general rule, workers'
compensation coverage does not
exclude inlury due to war.7
During the Vietnamese Wat,
many life insurance policies con-
tained war risk exclusions.s Now,
however, the American Council of
Life Insurers, the main life insur-
ance trade groupr asserts that the
life insurers stopped using war
exclusions in their policies in the
l-970s. This is likely the reason why
insurers Lke Metropolitan Life and
Northwestern Mutual Life were able
to announce quickly that they would
pay claims knowrng that few
persons in the WTC work force
would have been old enough to
have pre-Vietfiafi era life insurance
policies.
Because insurance had its
bifth in the maritime industry and
because maritime shipping has
throughout history been a target in
wars, the wat risk exclusion is most
prevalent, explicit, and nteqpreted
by courts ur maritime policies.e In
those policies, these exclusions are
called "Free of Capture and SeDure"
or "FCS" clauses.l0 Interestingly,
none of the FCS exclusions covers
piacyTr,which may be viewed more
^s 
an zct of theft than a wadike
gesture.
The War Risk Exclusions
War risk exclusions genetally
bar coverage for damages resulting
frorr' "w zr, invasion, civil war,
revolution, insurrection or warlike
operations, whether there be a
declaration of war ot not."12 Most
properry insurance policies nclude
act-of-war clauses in their exclu-
sions. The exclusion will commonly
provide as follows:
We wdl not pay for loss or
damage caused ditectly or
indirectly by any of the
following. Such loss or
damage is excluded rega.rdless
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of atty other cause or event 11 are acts of war within the of the covered property. Also, the
that cofltributes concurrently meaning of the exclusions. ,A.s z court noted that the exclusion was
or in any sequence to the loss. general rule, the courts have been ambiguous with regard to political
* * * frnding acts of terrorism not to be hijackings and that the carriers, in
War and Military Âction acts of war under the exclusion. For light of the 200 aidine hijackings
1. Wa4includrng example, a case with striking that had occurred in the previous
undeclared or civil war; similarities to events of September ten years, (eight of which involved
2 Warlike actron by a 11 is the !974 case of Pan Pan Âm planes), knew of the
-ilit"ry force, including Amedcan Wodd Aírways, fnc. v. ambi$xty but did not change it.
action in hindering or Aetna Casualty & Sweqt Co.rla The court held rhata""war"
defending aganstan from the Second Circuit. On required the enga.gement of
actual or
expected quasi-sovereign
attack,by The court held that alfuaf, required the engagement of nations and that
any gov- sovereign or quasi-sovereign nations and that an 'rinsurrectiontt an "insurtection"emment, must involve an intent to overthrow a lawfully constituted regime. must involve ansovereþ intent to
or other ovefthrow a
,".ttãlf
using constituted
-ilit ry personnel or September 6,1970, the Popular regime. Consequently, it held that
other agents; or Front for the Liberation of Palestine the policies did not exclude coverage
3 insurrection, rebellion, hijacked a Pan Äm jetliner departing of losses related to political hijack-
revolution, usurped ,{msterdam for New York. Over ing; that the loss was not due to
power or actron taken by London, they diverted the plane to destruction by military or usulped
govemmental authority Beirut where they landed for fuel power and was not due to war,
in hindering or defending and took on a demolitions expert. wadike operations, insurrection, civil
against any of these. They flew the plane to Cairo where commotion, or riot within the
they evacuated the passengets and exclusion clauses of the policies.
Court Construction of the totally destroyed the airplane by The court found the hijackings and
Act-of-War Exclusions explosion causing a loss of over $24 destruction of the aircnft to be for
The inventiveness of man- million. On the same da¡ the PFLP propagndapurposes and not for
kind in desþing violent solutions hijacked a TWA airlinerãeparting ã,."ih-.o- o^f thä gor."*-"rrt,
to political problems requires the Fra¡kfurt and a Swissair jet leaving involved in ownership of the aircraft
courts to examine coordinated Zutich,while being foiled in an or their ailports involved with
violence to determine if it consti- attempt to hijack an El Al aidiner. departure or landing. Neither was
tutes an "act. of w^r." As one The TWA and Swissair planes were the PFLP a sovereþ that could
author said:l3 both flown to aJordanian airfield engage kt a"wzt."
Hostlities between nations and destroyed by explosives while In lfofiday fnns, fnc. v.
and civil wars are not always surrounded byJordanian troops. Aetna fnsurance Co.rls (S.D.N.Y.,
conducted on a formal basis The insurers who carried "all 1983) the insurers were trying to
and often have no precise risk" policies on the Pan Am plane avoid paying for the loss of the
temporal or spatial bound- sought to avoid coverage by reason Beirut Holiday Inn. The llotel,
aries. Despite several centuries of the act-of-war exclusion. The which opened n lg74,became a
of experience with war court, in its review, compared the focai point for factional fighting in
exclusions and the best (and burdens of the parties pointing out the Kandari district of West Beimt
sometimes less then the best) that the insurers needed to prove tn 1975 and 1976. An amaz:mgartay
drafting efforts, questions of that the proximate cause of the loss of political parties, front groups,
whether or not a loss is fell within their exclusion, while the commando groups, militia groups,
covered by a"wat exclusion" exclusion would be given the inter- and other otgarrizattons caused the
are still being brought to the pretation most beneficial to the hotel to change hands numerous
courts for settlemeut. insured. The court asserted that the times in armed fighting which
msured, Pan ,\m, under the all risk appzreniy rendered it unfit for a
The essential question is policy, needed only to show the Best Westem designatron and
whethet attacks such as September existence of the policies and the loss resulted ìn a claim for its loss.
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The exclusion in the Holiday
Inns policy provided:
2. This insurance does not
cover:
a.) Loss or damage caused by
any of the perils hereby
insured against, if such loss
or damage either in origin or
extent is directly or indirectly,
proximately or remotely,
occasioned by or contributed
to by any of the following
occurrences, or either in
origin or extent, directly or
indirectly, proximately or
remotely, arises out of or in
connection with any such
occuffences, namely:' \X/ at,
invasion, act of foreþ
enemy, hostilities or wadike
operations (whether war be
declared or not) civil war,
mutiny, insurrection,
revolution, conspirac¡
-ilitury or usulped power."
The court n lfoliday Inn
adopted the defmition of "insur-
rection" from the Pan Am case and
held that an insurrection must be
prcplr.atory to a civil war. llowever,
the court found that the parties
were fightrng for òontrol of the
district and that none was trying to
overthrow the Lebanese govern-
ment, not even the Palestinian and
Syrian forces involved.
It is agaurst this background
that the courts today would decide
whether the attacks of September
Ll were "acts-of-war." While bin
Laden's organizaion certainly
advocates the overthrow of
govemments unfriendly to funda-
mentalist Muslim govemments and
even Muslim govemments that are
too moderate, his organization is
unlikely to be found to be a
"sovereþ" so as to be engaged in a
war. Though the events of
September l,l, far exceed in death
and damages those of the Pan Am
case in l-970, the WTC attacks could
still be viewed as undertaken for
putposes ofpropaganda and not
the overthrow of the United States.
T}ae Pan Am and lfofiday Inn
cases holding that war must occur
between sovereþs and that
insurrection must necessarily be
aimed at overthrow of the govem-
ment likely persuaded the $(/TC
insuters not to stand on the acts-oÊ
war exclusions. Admittedly, there
are substantial cases in favor of the
insurers on this issue. In at least
seven cases, courts have enforced
the war and insurrection exclu-
sions.16 FIowever, in each of the
seven cases, the property subject to
the exclusion was damaged during
wars or insurrections by groups
exptessly attempting to overthrow
exis trng govemments. 17
The insured in the case of a
terrorism loss will likely not hzve a
diffrcult time meeting the burden of
showing that the loss falls within the
coverage oF the basic insuring
agreement. The property /casuùty
policies use broad insuring 
^gree-
ments followed, especially in the
case of commercial general liability
policies, by a long list of exclusions.
In terrorism cases, it becomes
incumbent on the insurer to prove
that the claim falls within the war
risk exclusion. The insurer's burden
is made more difhcult because the
insurance contract is a contract of
adhesion. Consequently, courts
likely will construe an ambiguous
war risk exclusion against the
insurer and in fzvor of the insured.
Finally, zs z mztter of social policy,
coutts typically construe an insur-
ance exclusion nartowly ìn favor
of coverage.
The Specter of Terrorism
Exclusions
With the exception of
zviarton insurance, Ame rican
insurance companies have not used
terrorism exclusions ur their
policies. It was apparentJy clear to
the insurers that the war risk
exclusions as previously interpreted
in such cases as Pan Amatd
Ifofiday Innwould not protect
them from the claims arisng from
the September L1 attacks. Never-
theless, it is equally clear that the
industry will take no chance of
suffering similar losses in the
future. FIence, they will follow the
lead of the carriers in Britaìn and
the conti-nent who use terrorism
exclusions tailored to acts of
political terrorism and hijacking
that cannot be inter-preted to
apply only to acts of sovereigns
or acts designed to overthrow
govefnmeflt.
Such terrorism exclusions
would have profound implications
for commercial insureds who want
to protect their property from the
heightened risks posed by modem
terrorism, especially risks involved
in transportation and energy. Inabilrty
to insure agzinst loss by terrorism
could stifle or err'en freeze some com-
ponents of the economy. füuld one
operate trains, busses, or commercial
aircraft without coverage for losses
from terrorism? füuld agro-up build a
sþ-scraper, amusement parþ or
athletrc stadium without such cover-
aç? Would banks lend to build such
projects if their mo4gaçes' interesr
were not nsured against such losses?
Should the regulators, the National
Associatìon of Insurance Commis-
sioners, forbid terrorism exclusions?
Would the ndustry refuse to insure
without the exclusions?
It is easy to be critical of the
industry for refusing to cover that
which is such a visible and rmpor-
tant risk. After all, isn't that the
pulpose of insurance? In the
insurers defense, one of the pnn-
ciples of insurance underwriting is
that the insurer should only under-
write those losses that can be
calculated both in terms of
frequency and magnitude of loss.
State Farm actuaries can tell with
reasonable certainty how many of
their insureds will be in auto acci-
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dents and how much they will pay
in indemnity benefits next year.
They can even predict with
acitarial reliability how many
earthquakes they will pay out on
in a given 100-year pedod. But no
insurer can predict what will
constitute next year's terrorism,
either in characte4 ftequency,
magnitude, or geographic
location. That is why providing
war risk insurance where
terrorism is likely is so expensive.
Following the invasion of Kuwait,
the war risk insurance prernium
for a single flight to the Saudi
Arabian capìtal of Ruyadh was
$1ó2,500.te Â flight to Tel Âviv
Israel was $65,000, and a I(LM
stop ât Oman cost ân additional
premium of $57,700.le Such
premiums to cover terrorism
added anywhere from $L00 to
$1,000 cost per passenger. ì7orse,
the coverage term was per flight
fot avtatton and on 224-hour
basis for marine hulls.2o It was
the insurers way of saying we
can't predict or underwrite the
risk.
Insuring the Insurers Against
Terrorism
A strugle with economic,
political, social ramifications is in
progress now ovef the core ques-
tion of how we should best spread
the losses from acts of terrorism.
The industry's immediate move v/as
to ask Congress to cover 100% of
the cost of insuring terrorism. The
Bush administration countered with
a proposal that the taxpayers would
shoulder the first 80% of the cost of
terrorism leaving the rest to
indusúy. Both proposals beg the
NruW
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question of why govemment (read
taxpayers) should be the first payor.
Why not let govemment be the
ultìmate reinsurer and let the
insurers cover the undedying risk in
layers. The British govemment
formed'?ool Re" the "teinsurer of
last resort" which provides coverage
beyond the exclusions of the private
insurers.2l The British system
provides five layers of coverage with
the govemment covering after the
private layers are exhausted.22
It is not unusual fot govem-
merit to act as reinsurer of wartime
risks. Encou :ragngprivate marine
and aviation transport in tlme of
war requires that government take
the ultimate catastrophic risks. This
often leaves private insurers to
"cherry pick," that is to collect pre-
miums where the losses are capPed.
F{ence, the old saying that war is
good for insurance companies.
Covering the Consumer for
Loss from Terrorism
How will the. consumer
ultrmately be protected ftom risk
of terrorism? It is too eady to tell,
and there is a staring contest going
on between regulators and the
industry to see who blinks first.
Insurers are threatening to exclude
coverage for terrorist acts, which
would bring disarray to whole
areas of the economy. When
Florida planned to ban terrorism
exclusions, the insurers made clear
their intention to refuse insurance
for Disney Wodd. Congress, on
the other hand, doesn't want to
shoulder the entire risk of terror-
ism.If Congress doesn'tblink and
terrorism exclusions become the
norm, entities in the economy
whose terrodsm risk demand
protection will ultimately have to
buy insurance in the form of
waivers of the exclusion by
endorsement or by sepârate
terrorism coverage just as entities
now buy war tisk coverage. One
can guess that coverage might be
minimal, premiums expensive, and
policy terms very short. On the
other hand, if Congress were to
agree to be the primary insurer for
the first 80% of risk, terrorism
exclusions may not appear in
American policies. So long as the
loss did not fall under the act-of-
war exclusions, coflsumers would
still be protected from loss by acts
of political terrorism.
Conclusion
The coordinated attacks on
the WTC and Pentagon on
September 11 revealed that losses
from an act of tertorism could
rival those of acts of war and
threaten the financial viability of
the insurers that make American
enteqprise possible. The insurers
agree that they will sun'ive this
loss but will not take the chance
on another of the same or greater
magnitude. The risk of loss from
terrorist acts must be spread
across American society somehow.
The loss can be spread in the form
of premiums in the pool of
insureds, primartly those putchas-
ing property, casualty, and
workers' compensation insurance.
If that happens, there will be steep
increases in premiums in some
lines as insureds are forced by
terrorism exclusions to buy
endorsements or policies that
provide terrorism covetage.
Alternativel¡ the loss can be
spread to the pool of American
taxpayers in the form of additional
taxes required to allow the govern-
ment to underwrite all or a milor
part of the risk of terrorism. There
is great urgency in developing the
American structute for dealing
with terrorism losses through
insutance, and one can expect to
see the plan formed in the next
few months as Congress, the
insurers, and the White House
negotiate.
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